Official angle: Pakistan's External Affairs — Relations with US/China, 40 Marks

Background

• US-China strategic and trade competition (tariffs, tech export controls, supply-chain "de-risking") has intensified through the 2020s, with renewed tariff escalations in 2025–26 under the Trump administration.
• Pakistan sits structurally between the two: CPEC anchors it firmly in China's economic orbit, while the US remains a key export market (notably textiles) and IMF/multilateral-lending influence channel.

Pakistan's Position (2026)

• Pakistan pursues a policy of "non-alignment" or "all-weather friend to China, cooperative partner to the US" rather than picking sides, reflecting limited leverage to influence the trade war itself.
• Potential upside: some supply-chain diversification away from China ("China+1") could theoretically benefit Pakistan's textile/manufacturing exports if it improves ease-of-doing-business and energy costs — though Pakistan has captured only a modest share of this shift compared to Vietnam, Bangladesh, or India.
• Risk: deeper US-China rivalry increases pressure on Pakistan over Chinese debt/CPEC transparency (a recurring US/IMF talking point) and complicates dual-track diplomacy.

CSS Exam Angle

Use for "great power competition and Pakistan's foreign policy choices" style questions — emphasize strategic hedging rather than alignment as Pakistan's core approach.

Expanded Material for a Full 20-Mark Answer

Introduction (write-up)

As US-China strategic and economic competition has intensified into a full-spectrum contest over tariffs, technology, and supply chains through 2025–26, Pakistan finds itself structurally positioned between the two powers in a way few other states are — bound to China through CPEC's foundational economic architecture, yet dependent on the US-influenced IMF/multilateral system for financial stability and on Western markets for its largest export sector.

Additional Dimensions

• Structural bind, not free choice: unlike states that can meaningfully "choose sides," Pakistan's position is one of structural interdependence — CPEC debt and infrastructure cannot be unwound without severe economic cost, while IMF programs (largely US-influenced through voting-share weight) remain essential to avoiding balance-of-payments crises, as demonstrated repeatedly since 2022.
• Trade-war-specific dynamics: escalating US tariffs on Chinese goods and expanding technology export controls (semiconductors, AI chips) through 2025–26 have accelerated global supply-chain "de-risking" — companies diversifying manufacturing away from China toward alternative low-cost manufacturing bases (the "China+1" strategy).
• Pakistan's limited capture of the "China+1" opportunity: despite theoretical upside, Pakistan has captured a much smaller share of relocating manufacturing/textile investment than regional competitors like Vietnam, Bangladesh, and India — attributable to persistent energy-cost unpredictability, security concerns, ease-of-doing-business rankings, and political instability, all of which are legitimate self-critical points for a strong CSS answer.
• CPEC transparency pressure: deeper US-China rivalry has increased Western/IMF scrutiny of Chinese-linked debt structures globally, including CPEC — a recurring point of friction in Pakistan's IMF program negotiations regarding debt transparency and restructuring terms.

Statistics & Examples to Cite

• Textile exports remain Pakistan's largest export category (roughly 55–60% of total exports), with the US historically its single largest single-country export destination — directly exposing Pakistan to any US tariff or trade-policy shifts.