Official CSS Syllabus Item: Global Issues — part of 40 Marks
Answer Structure
- Definition/background 2. Current global status 3. Pakistan's specific stake 4. Key debates/challenges 5. Conclusion
- Current major disruptor: 2026 Iran war and Strait of Hormuz dispute — a critical global oil chokepoint under direct contest between US and Iran
- Oil price volatility directly tied to Hormuz negotiations — prices eased toward $82/barrel on de-escalation reports mid-2026, but fighting resumed 30 August 2026 and Brent has since climbed back near $95/barrel (early September 2026) as Iran extended strikes to Gulf-state air bases (Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Jordan)
- September 2026 update: the US naval blockade of Iranian shipping has grown to 80–90+ vessels redirected/disabled; Gulf shipping traffic through Hormuz has fallen below its 10-day average even though a record ~17 million barrels still transited on a single day (1 Sept 2026) — illustrating that the strait remains functionally open but under heavy strain rather than fully closed, a nuance worth using over blanket "Hormuz is closed" claims
- New second chokepoint at risk (Sept 2026): the Yemen civil war's 2026 resumption and the Houthis' naval blockade/direct strikes on Saudi Arabia (8–9 Sept 2026) now put the Bab al-Mandeb Strait — carrying ~7.4 million barrels/day, ~7% of global oil output — at risk simultaneously with Hormuz; analysts warn combined disruption of both straits could restrict up to 25% of global oil and gas supply, a dual-chokepoint scenario with no recent precedent (see the dedicated Yemen Crisis page for full detail)
- Saudi Arabia has partly hedged this risk by rerouting crude through its East-West pipeline to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, where throughput has roughly quadrupled (from ~1 million to ~4 million barrels/day)
- Broader trends: energy transition (renewables vs fossil fuels), OPEC+ production decisions, Russia's energy leverage over Europe
- Pakistan's stake: heavily oil/gas import-dependent — Hormuz disruption directly threatens energy security and import costs; the added Bab al-Mandeb risk compounds this exposure since Pakistan's Gulf energy imports and its Makkah-pact commitment to Saudi Arabia are now both engaged simultaneously